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Evaluating the Role of Personality Trait Information in Social Dilemmas
Todd Guilfoos, Kenneth J. Kurtz

Abstract
We investigate whether cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is conditional on
information about a partner’s personality traits. Using a repeated one-shot
continuous strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma (two person Public Goods game), we test
how information on personality traits of partners influences cooperative actions.
Before each game we provide subjects with the rank-order of their partner (relative
to all subjects in the session) on one of the personality traits of the Big Five
Inventory. Using a within-subjects design we find that subjects are more
cooperative when informed that their partner is more ‘Agreeable’ or ‘Open to
Experience’. The primary reason for more cooperative behavior is the expectation
that partners will give more to the public good.

Keywords: Cooperation, Big five personality inventory, Expectation formation,
Social cognition

JEL: C72, C91, D03, D70

Introduction
Cooperation is a key component of many economic situations, for example
the co-management of common pool resources, treaty negotiations, or building
teams. Cooperation creates opportunities to improve economic outcomes and/or


Corresponding author: guilfoos@uri.edu
Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island.
219 Coastal Institute, 1 Greenhouse Rd, Kingston 02881, RI, USA.

Department of Psychology, Binghamton University


1

increase efficiency through collective action, like in the prisoner’s dilemma. The
institutions that influence individual cooperative actions are important, such as
rules or social norms, and so are the motivations, preferences, and cognitive
processes that govern cooperative decisions. We know that cooperation can be
conditional on previous play in repeated games via reciprocity and trust (e.g. Fehr
and Gächter 2000a, Cox 2004, Berg et al 1995, Nowak and Sigmund 2005) or even
through social comparisons (Frey and Meier 2004).

In addition to induced

cooperation it is known that some individuals have pro-social preferences in social
dilemmas, known sometimes as Social Value Orientation (Balliet et al. 2009). Most
of the economic research done on non-cooperative games focuses on how past play
interacts with institutions to govern behavior. While these aspects of cooperation
are well established there is less research on how the perceptions of partners and
their traits shape cooperative strategies and pro-social behavior. Information about
partner’s behavior and traits may both play a role in how cooperation evolves in
social dilemmas.
In many real life situations detailed and accurate information on past actions
may be difficult to come by without a formal mechanism to enforce accurate
reporting. Consider many common pool resources, such as fisheries or aquifers,
that depend on management structures that report and audit behavior. Some other
forms of information may be more readily available through social interactions,
which we call social information. Social information about others (e.g., gender,
intelligence, or personality) is likely to be available or impressions of these
information sets can be formed from social interactions. Perceptions of social
information may be used to condition behavior or form expectations about other’s
behavior. For instance, when new teams form to accomplish a common task, each
individual has an incentive to free ride on other team members in completing the
task if individual contributions are hidden. This is a common problem that most
college students face when assigned group work for a class where there are
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incentives to free ride on other group members.1 Each team member must decide
how much effort to put toward the team objective and may have limited experience
or knowledge of other team members. Therefore, individuals are left with little past
play information to base inferences on and may use social information of their new
team members to form expectations of behavior. Even in repeated play situations,
if information is incomplete, then information of player types could be influential
to the expectations about other’s play. This could be particularly important when
groups adopt new rules or regulations as play under the new rules has not been
observed even when past behavior is observable. Take for example the initial
forming of a coalition of fisherman to undergo joint restrictions on fish harvestingbefore all fisherman reduce harvesting effort there is no information on past play
under the new restrictions. There are also a host of other situations in which
expectations of individual’s pro-social preferences are likely to be important such
as conflict resolution, negotiations (Hosmanek et al 2014), international
agreements, complex governance agreements (Conca et al 2006), and research and
design work (Mora-Valentin et al 2004).
The characteristics of other people can play multiple roles in group
decisions. Social identification, i.e., the level of kinship with others, can influence
trust in partner’s behavior since individuals may identify with others based on
certain characteristics (Ahmed 2007, De Cremer and Van Vugt 1999). The feeling
of kinship with others is also referred to as social distance. Charness and Gneezy
(2008) find that providing the names of partners decreases social distance and
increases allocations to partners in dictator games. Buchan et al. (2006) find that
subjects give more in an investment game to partners of the same country of origin.
These examples suggest that social distance may affect other-regarding
preferences. Social information like personality traits may also reduce social
1

Though there are mechanisms to overcome this situation, such as evaluations of each student by
their peers.

3

distance in social dilemmas and influence judgements about whether to cooperate
with partners whom subjects identify with based on similar traits.
Forming expectations about player personality may also be an important
aspect of the social cognition that underlies the interaction (Frith and Singer 2008,
Bodenhausen 2010) – including the formation of beliefs about the player’s
intentions and the appropriate way to respond in a social situation. Psychological
studies have demonstrated how perceptions of others, through facial features or eye
gaze, are used to make judgements about personality types (Bayliss and Tipper
2006, Bayliss et al 2006, Wolffhechel et al 2014). Research has also connected
personality types to the categorization of others to make decisions in social contexts
(Macrae and Bodenhausen 2001) though this line of inquiry has not been linked
specifically to economic decisions and incentives.
Why might social information be used in conditioning expectations about
another person’s behavior? Primarily because social information has power in
predicting economic behavior and preferences. Studies have established that
behavior can vary across important attributes of the population such as personality
type (Borghans et al 2010). The attributes of individuals can affect pro-social
preferences: intelligent groups cooperate more than less intelligent groups (Jones
2008), females cooperate more often than males (Molina et al. 2013), and social
identity increases cooperation (Chen et al 2014). Along these lines, Cobb-Clark
and Schurer (2012) show that personality traits are stable inputs into economic
decisions. Therefore, individuals can demonstrate stable preferences for
cooperation. Stable personality traits and cooperative preferences would allow for
perceptions of types to become more salient in the real world. Ben-Ner et al (2004)
report that personality measures have predictive power in the dictator game –
sharing behavior relates to Agreeableness in both males and females. Team
composition and Openness to Experience explain performance in group tasks:
greater Openness to Experience of team members improved team performance
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(LePine 2003). LePine et al (2001) also find that Agreeableness explains
cooperative behavior in team tasks. Muller and Schwieren (2014) report that
personality traits are important in predicting behavior in trust related games,
especially in situations where economic incentives are weak. Openness to
Experience is also related to increased responses in the reward-sensitive region of
the brain when choosing cooperative actions in a social context (Morawetz et al
2014). Schroeder et al (2015) find that Extraversion is associated with less freeriding when individuals are subject to the institution of punishment. The authors
also report that agreeableness is associated with more giving to the public good,
while neuroticism is associated with less giving to the public good. The personality
traits of subjects can predict behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Boone et al
(1999) finds that internal locus of control, high self-monitoring, and high sensation
seeking traits are associated with more cooperative play in the prisoner dilemma
games. Al-Ubaydli et al (2014) find that group’s average Openness to Experience
predicts first round cooperative behavior in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
experiment.
A small number of studies explore whether players use social information
to condition their strategies in non-cooperative economic games: Schwieren and
Sutter (2007) find that men trust female more than male partners in their
mathematical ability; and Van Lange and Liebrand (1994) report that subjects
expected high contributions to the public good in partners perceived as honest or
less intelligent. Other studies have established that perceptions are important to
game play in other ways. Labels such as ‘trust’, ‘cooperate’, or ‘defect’ used in a
prisoner’s dilemma game to describe strategies induce more cooperation by
subjects and increased the perceptions that others would play cooperatively (Zhong
et al 2007). Tinsley et al (2002) demonstrate that perception of partner’s experience
in negotiations affected the reputation and ultimately the behavior of subjects.
Experience is viewed negatively by novices which reduces the ability of
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experienced negotiators to capitalize on their real negotiation expertise. These
studies establish that the expected value of strategies are not only conditional on
past play but on perceptions as well.
The critical question we address is: how does information about
personalities of partners change cooperative play and expectations of partners in a
non-cooperative economic game? We employ a laboratory experiment and provide
subjects with personality information about their partners to investigate this
question. Exploring expectations of personality types in a non-cooperative
economic game furthers the research on other-regarding preferences and
cooperation. Other-regarding preferences are required for cooperation in this game
because the Nash Equilibrium of the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma is to defect
regardless of the partner’s strategy. Other-regarding preferences are well
established – we test whether other-regarding preferences depend on personality
trait information.
In our study, participants answer a 44 question Big Five Personality
Inventory that scores subjects in each of the Big Five personality traits. Subjects
then play a repeated one-shot public goods game with anonymous partners and are
provided with one piece of personality information about their partner. In five
separate treatments subjects are provided with the rank-order of their partner on one
of the Big Five Personality Traits (Agreeableness, Extraversion, Neuroticism,
Conscientiousness, or Openness to Experience). Having completed the inventory
at the beginning of the session, subjects are likely to take the ranking information
at face value. Subjects receive a short, clear description of the personality trait and
how to interpret high versus low rankings (shown in Table 1). Partner identity is
kept completely anonymous. Subjects are not given their own ranking or raw
scores. The information treatment is the relative position of their partner within the
group on a given trait – which prompts a particular perception of the partner. We
argue traits are perceived because we provide the rank-order of the given trait and
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it does not necessarily provide accurate information about the level of any trait.2
For example, the agreeableness of a subject’s partner could be ranked first among
all subjects in a session, but that same partner could potentially have a low absolute
score in agreeableness if all subjects scored low in Agreeableness, so the ranking
information is a measure of perceived Agreeableness. The claim that subjects
receive perceived trait information is less stringent than the claim that subjects have
accurate information about the actual traits of their partners; subjects are provided
with accurate information about their partner’s relative traits to the current subject
pool. The anonymous one-shot game is used to isolate the effect of perceptions of
partners and separate the perceptions from reciprocity from past or future play.3
Specifically, repeated interactions could lead to cooperation in expectation of
greater future profits through reciprocity or punishment by partners in the future.
To preview our results: we find that partner’s personality traits are important
to cooperative decisions. Specifically, subjects with partners who ranked high in
terms of Agreeableness and Openness to Experience give more to the public good.
We find that the primary reason for increased giving to the public good is reciprocal
expectations of partners with high Agreeableness and Openness to Experience.
Using the difference between the absolute scores of personality traits between
subjects and their partners we also measure the effect of this distance measure on
behavior. We find a decrease in the distance between Neuroticism scores of players
increases their contributions to the public good – though the distance between other
personality trait scores does not affect cooperative behavior. These results
demonstrate that personality information and perceptions of others are important to
cooperation in social dilemmas.
2

It could be that subjects view the rankings to be objective measures of personality, it is also
plausible that subjects completely recognize the difference in how ranking measures may diverge
from raw scores.
3
Repeat interactions between subjects would be an interesting future work, as it could identify the
relative importance of characteristics of subject’s partners relative to knowledge of past behavior.
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Experimental Design
There are three stages in the experiment. The first stage is comprised of
collecting personality trait and demographic information through a questionnaire.
The second stage, the main part of experiment, is a repeated one-shot, two-person
public goods game with information treatments revealing partner’s rank ordering
of a given personality trait (detailed in Table 2). In the third stage, subjects are
allowed to choose which of the Big Five personality trait rankings they receive for
each round of a public goods game. This last stage provides a measure of the
relative value of the different personality trait rankings.
In the first stage, subjects take a forty-four question personality inventory
(Filiz-Ozbay et al. 2013) on the computer. Subjects were asked to provide truthful
answers to these questions, but were not told of any further use of the data at this
point in the experiment. Since the questionnaire was implemented on the computer,
the raw scores and rank-ordering of all subjects in a given session were calculated
immediately upon completion of the survey. Rank-ordering refers to the rank of the
subject relative to other subjects in the same session for a given trait.
In the second stage of the experiment subjects play a repeated one-shot
public goods game with randomly assigned anonymous partners in each round. This
game is the same as a typical prisoner’s dilemma game except that the decision
space is continuous. Subjects must decide how to allocate 10 tokens between the
private good and the public good; 0 tokens to the public good being the same as
‘defect’ and 10 tokens to the public good being the same as ‘cooperate’ in the
prisoner’s dilemma game.4 The game is linear and has payoffs of $0.75 for each
token invested in the private good option and $0.50 for each token invested by the
subject and their partner in the public good option. Subjects are provided with
4

We frame the choice as taking away from the common pool, which is more similar to a common
pool resource, but has the same theoretical equilibrium that the public good framing contains.
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examples of the payoffs in the instructions and experience four practice rounds to
gain experience with the game. There are six experimental information treatments
as shown in Table 2; a treatment is defined as a set of six rounds with information
on one of the personality traits (the rank-ordering of the subject’s partner). The
treatments are randomly ordered between sessions to guard against ordering effects.
Subjects are not told how many rounds or how many treatments to expect, but are
reminded of the random and anonymous partner assignment at the beginning of
each treatment.5 We instruct subjects that the rank-ordering of a trait is computed
from their responses to the personality questionnaire given in stage 1 and provide
subjects with a written description of high and low rankings of the personality trait
of that information treatment. The experimenter reads the description for only the
relevant personality trait during each information treatment. Within each
information treatment subjects do not encounter the same partner twice to eliminate
reciprocal play or punishment based on identity of their partner – this design choice
isolates the effect of perceived traits in behavior within a treatment.6
In the third stage of the experiment subjects choose which personality trait
rank-ordering information they gain access to in another anonymous one-shot
public goods game one round at a time. Subjects play an additional six rounds of
the public goods game in this stage of the experiment.

5

Subjects are probably able to guess by the end of the experiment that each treatment is six
rounds, but this likely does not matter since subjects are playing a series of one shot games – this
design feature would likely matter more if the six rounds were played with the same partner
inducing an end round effect.
6
We use a predetermined random matching system based on the subject’s computer station in the
lab that ensures that subjects do not encounter the same partner during the same treatment, as this
information could be used to punish previous partners for low contributions to the public good in
earlier rounds. Since there are 14 subjects in each session, subjects will interact with the same
partner’s approximately 3 times over the course of the experiment. Even though there are repeat
interactions across the experiment, there is no way for subjects to know how many repeat
interactions are likely (since they do not know how many rounds are in the experiment), or when
they are interacting with another person (since it is anonymous).
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The flow of information to subjects is critical in this study. In the first stage,
subjects are not aware of the personality categories or how their answers in the
questionnaire will be used during the rest of the experiment. No materials are
provided to subjects with information about the personality rankings or categories.
During the second stage of the experiment subjects learn about each personality
trait individually and are provided instructions that describe only the personality
trait ranking in that treatment. Knowledge about future personality trait categories
or number of traits being used in the experiment is not available to subjects – only
at the last information treatment are subjects aware of all of the personality trait
categories. At the beginning of the third stage, subjects are provided with a handout
that contains all personality trait categories and interpretations of the rankings. At
this point in the experiment subjects know all the possible personality trait
categories. Our primary hypotheses are addressed in stage two of the experiment.

Experimental Procedures
We recruited 98 undergraduate subjects at a large public university in the
United States during the spring and fall of 2015 through class announcements and
email. The experiment was programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007). Sessions were run in a laboratory environment where subjects were in
private work stations with dividers and could not communicate or make eye contact
with other subjects during the experiment. Instructions were read aloud and
provided on-screen with supplemental information printed out in the order dictated
by the treatment ordering for that session (materials provided in Appendix A). Each
session included 14 subjects who completed all three stages of the experiment in
the order described above. The symmetry in the size of session groups allows for
the comparability of the rank ordering across sessions. After the third stage,
subjects were provided with cash payments based on their cumulative earnings
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across all the games. Average earnings per subject were $26.57. Each session lasted
approximately 1.5 hours including reading the instructions and making payments.

Expected Outcomes
This study is an exploratory analysis of perceptions about partner
personality traits and conditional expectations. The mechanism that we believe is
at work is that real world experience leads to expectations of partners with
particular traits – in the present study we expect to see changes in behavior based
on rank ordering information about partners enabling identification of subject’s
beliefs about personality types and the resulting effect on cooperative behavior.
Previous economic and psychology studies suggest more Agreeable individuals
cooperate more (LePine et al 2001). Openness to Experience is found to be related
to cooperative behavior in non-cooperative games (Al-Ubaydli et al. 2014) and is
related to responses in the reward center of the brain (Morawetz et al. 2014) in
social settings. If individuals with these traits, Agreeableness and Openness to
Experience, exhibit pro-social behavior in everyday interactions, then people may
develop expectations that partners with these traits would be more cooperative. If
subjects are reciprocal and prefer to give more to the public good when they expect
their partner to give more to the public good, then partner’s traits can affect
cooperative behavior. The findings from the literature reviewed above suggest the
following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Subjects whose partners have higher rankings of Agreeableness are
more cooperative.
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Hypothesis 2: Subjects whose partners have higher rankings of Openness are more
cooperative.

We premise much of our analysis on the expectations formation by subjects
about their partner’s play though we cannot completely discern between two
explanations of cooperative behavior: that increasingly cooperative actions are
based on either reciprocal expectations of partners or charitable intentions by
subjects. Therefore, in the last three sessions we prompted subjects to provide
written responses to inquiries about their strategies and how they used the
personality information provided during the experiment (these prompts were given
as the last task in the experiment after all games were played).

Results
Rankings of Partners
We explore public good contributions by subject using a random-effects
two limit Tobit model. This model incorporates the fact that data is censored at both
0 and 10 and that each subject had six decisions in a given treatment,
accommodating the nature of our data.7 The key identifying feature of our data will
be the within-subject design of public good giving by subjects conditional on
partner’s ranking. In Table 3 and Table 4 we present our main results from this
experiment and establish whether the traits of partners influence cooperative
actions in the public goods game. In both tables the column headings are the trait
that the ranking information corresponds with and controls are added for the
subject’s personality scores, distance to partner’s personality score, period of the
7

We cannot compute the corresponding fixed effects Tobit model as there is not a sufficient
statistic allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood function. We do examine
the robustness of the results estimating a fixed effect censored regression as suggested in Honore
(1992) and an unconditioned fixed effects Tobit model which is available upon request, and which
support the findings presented in Table 3 and 4.
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game, gender, session fixed effects, and number of previous experiments
completed. The distance to partner’s personality score is a control for social
distance and is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the raw
personality scores of subject and their partner. We refer to this as the personality
distance and calculate the variable by information treatment.8 The session fixed
effects control for the ordering of the information treatments. The variable of
interest, rank ordering of partner’s personality traits, is a continuous measure of
ranking in Table 3. This method uses rankings as a linear control in the public goods
game and retrieves the average slope of public good investments with respect to
partner’s ranking for each trait. In Table 4 we test the same hypothesis but use three
groups of partner’s rank to test for non-linearities in response to partner rankings.
The omitted group is “Group 1”, the highest ranking individuals for each
personality trait (rank 1 to 5), while “Group 2” consists of the middle ranking
individuals (rank 6 to 9), and “Group 3” are individuals with the lowest ranking
(rank 10 to 14); there are 14 participants in each session.
We find that subjects with higher ranking partners in terms of
Agreeableness contribute more to the public good in both the continuous control
for partner ranking and the group measure of partner rankings, supporting
hypothesis 1. The negative coefficient on the ranking of the partner shows that a
partner with a ‘high’ ranking (e.g. ranking = 1) would result in greater contributions
to the public good. The results suggest that subjects do contribute more to the public
good if their partner is highly ranked in terms of Agreeableness, although as shown
in Table 4 only the differences between the highest ranking partners and lowest
ranking partners is statistically significant. This suggests that more contributions

8

We include the personality distance for agreeableness scores during the rounds for the
information treatment in which agreeableness rankings are provided to subjects and personality
distance for openness scores when the rankings for partner’s openness are provided and so on for
the other personality traits.
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to the public good are made when partners are thought to be in the highly
“Agreeable” group compared to other lower ranked subjects.
Subjects with higher ranked partners in terms of Openness to Experience
contribute more to the public good as well, supporting hypothesis 2. In Table 3 we
find highly significant estimates that subjects will contribute more to the public
good when their partner is highly ranked in terms of Openness to Experience. The
findings in Table 4 are also similar to the results of Agreeable partners: more is
given to the public good only when partners are perceived as highly ‘Open’
compared to the rest of the subject pool.
We also find evidence that personality distance for Neuroticism is
significant. The negative and significant sign in Table 3 column 4 on the personality
distance coefficient shows that subjects give more to the public good when paired
with similarly neurotic partners. Pairs of subjects that both identify as nervous and
high-strung or calm and relaxed give more to the public good than pairs of subjects
with differing Neuroticism scores. It is important to clarify that subjects are not
given their own scores or rankings; so the effect and interpretation we posit here
depends on subjects identifying with a particular trait and that they also exhibit that
same trait. Some self-knowledge about subject’s own personality, without explicit
scores, is required. There exists some evidence that individuals are self-aware to a
degree of their own personality traits (Vazire and Carlson 2010) lending credence
to our interpretation of personality distance.
The personality traits Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness of
partners are not found to be statistically significant. The fact that not all the
personality rankings are significant increases our confidence that the findings of
Agreeableness and Openness to Experience are in fact categorizations that subjects
use and are not simply induced by providing information to subjects. We surmise
that these trait rankings are used in sufficiently noisy ways or completely ignored
by subjects. For instance, subjects may ignore rankings that do not conform to
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initial beliefs. Without consistent play by many subjects we will not find robust
evidence of the use of personality information since our identification relies on
within-subject variation across all subjects. Our findings support both hypothesis 1
and 2 and expectations of subjects conform to the pro-social behavior of Agreeable
and Open individuals found in other studies (LePine et al. 2001, Al-Ubaydli et al.
2014). It is noteworthy that the increase in contributions to the public good is
economically significant: an increase of roughly 20% to 30% of the total possible
contribution is made when subjects have partner types that are highly ranked in
Agreeableness or Openness.

Personality of Subjects
To investigate how the personality of subjects affects contributions to the
public good we estimate a different set of regressions that includes all the
information treatments. In Table 5, we present results of such a regression with
controls for demographics, information treatment effects, personality distance,
partner’s ranking by treatment controls, session fixed effects to control for
differences in cohorts, and a lag variable of the group contributions to the public
good in the previous period which may account for global strategies by players. We
again use a random effects Tobit model to account for the nature of the data. Here
subjects make thirty decisions across a session which include all the information
treatments.9 The control for partner’s rank is interacted with information treatment
effects, from Table 1. This control is equivalent to the results presented in Table 3,
but restricts other controls to have the same coefficients and includes all the data
across treatments in one regression. We provide a correlation matrix of the
personality measures in Table 6 to investigate co-linearities between traits that may

9

The 6 rounds without any information treatment are not included because of the interaction
between treatment and partner’s rank is used as a control, therefore these observations are
dropped.
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obfuscate their significance in the regression analysis. There does not appear to be
much concern as most of the traits are not highly co-linear.
The information treatment controls interacted with partner’s rank are
consistent with the results from Table 3. The point estimates are also stable with
the increase in lags of total contributions to the public good. This result increases
the robustness of the main result of the experiment and confirms that subjects with
partners of high Agreeableness and Openness lead to greater pro-social behavior.
We also include the measure of personality distance interacted with the
information treatment. Similar to the results in Table 3 and Table 4, we find that
the distance between personality scores does matter, but only for the information
treatment of Neuroticism (Treatment D). We find no evidence that personality
distance matters for any other personality trait. This also implies that the description
of Neuroticism provided to subjects may have an important meaning to them and
subjects likely identify and express more other-regarding preferences for similar
partners along this dimension of personality.
Interestingly we find some differences from our expectations of the
personality traits of subjects. Specifically, Openness to Experience is the opposite
sign of our expectations and not statistically significant. This implies that while
subjects would give more when their partners were highly ranked in Openness to
Experience, the expectation that these partners were contributing more to the public
good on average was actually incorrect. On the other hand, subjects were correct
about their partners that were ranked higher in terms of Agreeableness – which
likely reinforced those expectations.
Further, there is stronger evidence that other personality traits, Neuroticism
and Conscientiousness, are significant to cooperative behavior, but not to
expectations. Subjects who were rated as more neurotic were less cooperative and
gave less to the public good. While we did not have strong a priori expectations
with regard to Conscientiousness – and subjects did not appear to form expectations
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about players with varying levels of Conscientiousness – this personality trait
appears to be strongly linked to more selfish play. Players rated highly in
Conscientiousness are more deliberate and play closer to the Nash Equilibrium –
which recall other studies showing that subjects under time pressure tend to
cooperate more or that their intuitive responses are more cooperative (Rand et al
2014). We posit that a potential reason for the difference in personality measures
and expectations of partners is that this game may be unfamiliar to some subjects
and therefore priors formed before this experiment may be consistent with
cooperative behavior and traits in everyday social interactions, but not consistent
within the experiment. While it is surprising that the personality traits do not
conform to beliefs, it is important to recognize that subjects did not have many
rounds to adjust their prior beliefs to this new information provided in the
experiment.
In addition to personality measures, we find support that gender plays a
significant role in cooperative decisions. Female subjects choose to provision for
the public good at a much higher level than male subjects. This finding conforms
to results from previous experiments (Schwieren and Sutter 2008) where female
subjects tend to be more cooperative and give more in trust games.

Value of Information
In the third stage of the experiment we allow subjects to choose just one of
their partner’s personality traits to get information about in each round. This
provides insight into which personality trait information is considered more
valuable by subjects. The frequency of each personality ranking choice is provided
in Table 7. The trait that has the highest frequency of being chosen is
Agreeableness: roughly 40% of the time. This is evidence of the higher value of
rankings of Agreeableness as an information set and reinforces the findings from
the regression analysis that this information is being used by subjects in
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provisioning of the public good. Information on Agreeableness is also likely more
valuable because it conforms to expectations and predicts play of subjects. Other
traits are chosen approximately in the same frequency giving little evidence of their
relative value. The ranking of Openness to Experience is not chosen in greater
frequencies than other traits which is consistent with the fact that the trait of
Openness to Experience is used in cooperative decisions, but does not conform to
expectations (as shown in Table 5) potentially reducing its value. When
expectations are reinforced by experience, as they are for Agreeableness, that
information becomes more valuable to subjects. This leads us to presume there
may be some learning about traits, information, and play across the stages of the
experiment. Since our experiment is not designed to elicit the effects of learning,
we do not address the effects of learning on play. Extensions of this work could
lead to a better understanding of equilibrium play in non-cooperative games as
personality traits interacts with the building of reputation, trust, or punishment.

Player Motivation
We ask subjects to provide free form responses explaining their play and
strategies at the end of the experiment (note: this was only for the last three sessions
out of seven total).10 There is extensive literature in economics on other-regarding
preferences which suggest that reciprocal expectations and charitable giving are
important to social preferences and cooperative behavior. Sometimes the motives
of subjects are assessed through the design of the game – increased giving in
dictator games suggest charitable motives (Hoffman et al 1996) while repeat
interaction games suggest reciprocal motives (Clark and Sefton 2001). In line with
this literature the authors provide three categories that the written responses are

10

It did not occur to the researchers to gather information about strategies through open ended
questions until after the fourth experimental session, and therefore we do not have this information
for all subjects.
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assigned to by two independent research assistants not involved in the running of
the experiment and naïve to the experimental hypotheses. The three categories
responses are assigned to are: (1) ambiguous – motivation of subjects is unclear or
they explicitly say they did not use the rankings information; (2) cooperative
expectations – subjects indicate expectations of partners with certain traits will also
give more to the public good; and (3) charitable giving – subjects indicate that they
gave more to partners with certain traits because of the likability of those types of
partners.
There were forty-two responses scored by two independent raters with a
86% R-square between their categorical assignments. For further use of the scoring,
disagreements were resolved by a third research assistant without knowledge of the
experimental hypotheses. The analysis suggests that very few subjects are
motivated by charitable giving: 5%. The written responses for charitable giving
were vague. One respondent reported that they gave more to the public good
because their partner was “nice”, which does not shed light on if the subject had
expectations of a ‘nice’ partner or if they felt like sacrificing their own payoff for a
‘nice’ partner. 33% of subjects report that they did not use the ranking information.
Among reasons for this behavior were selfish motives to maximize payoffs which
indicate potential Nash Equilibrium play. Approximately 62% of subjects report
that they expected partners with certain traits to give more to the public good and
therefore also gave more. This analysis, in conjunction with the previous results,
indicates that larger contributions to the public good are made with reciprocal
expectations of partners with high perceived Agreeableness and Openness to
Experience.

Conclusion
Our experiment tested whether information about partner’s personality
traits influence cooperative behavior of subjects in a non-cooperative economic
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game and establishes that social information is used in cooperative game strategies.
Using a two-person public goods game, we find that the perception of high
Agreeableness and Openness to Experience of subjects’ partners increases
contributions to the public good. When partners are ranked as more ‘Agreeable’ or
more ‘Open’ they are thought to be more likely to contribute to the public good
which leads subjects to also give more to the public good. Therefore, pro-social
behavior is observed in play and is conditionally expected of others with certain
traits. The differences in public good contributions based on personality of partners
appears to be significant with only non-marginal changes in partner’s traits:
statistical differences are only found when comparing the highest ranked partners
to the lowest ranked partners. We also find, in the context of this game, that subjects
are correct in their expectations of partners ranked high in Agreeableness, but not
correct in their expectations of partners ranked high in Openness to Experience.
This fact potentially leads subjects to find information about the rank of
Agreeableness more valuable by the end of the experiment than the rank of other
personality traits.
Our findings suggest that more informal measures of a person’s character
are used when individuals decide to be cooperative. Personality is more than just a
latent characteristic of a person’s economic preferences, but also informs others as
to their likelihood of forming cooperative equilibria in non-cooperative settings. It
is important to remember that standard economic theory, through deductive
reasoning, suggests that social information should not be predictive of strategies in
social dilemmas. We argue that using personality information of partners can be
rational, as players should condition their strategies on predictable regularities of
partners. Conditional expectations and characterizations of player types could be
important in many settings, where previous play is unobservable, incomplete, or
costly to obtain, and pro-social expectations could be important toward the
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establishment of cooperation in bi-lateral agreements, negotiations, or coalitions in
common pool resources.
There are a number of other implications for conditional expectations based
on social information. When cooperative partners are sortable, social information
may be influential in how partners are chosen and have implications to the
evolutionary performance of groups or network building. In addition, signaling
these traits may be used to inform others of the intent to cooperate in noncooperative situations. This type of social signaling may be used similar to a type
of ‘secret hand-shake’ pre-play that is discussed in Anderlini and Sabourian (1995)
as players attempt to establish a perception of their ‘type’ to their partners. Further
research on how social information and past experiences interact will be useful to
more completely ascertain the relationship between social information and the rules
and social norms that govern behavior from past play.
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Table 1: Descriptions of High and Low Ranking Partners
Personality Trait Description of High Ranking
Description of Low Ranking
Partner
Partner
Agreeableness
good natured, sympathetic, forgiving, critical, rude, harsh, and callous
and courteous
Openness to
Experience

original, creative, curious, and
complex

Conscientiousness reliable, well-organized, selfdisciplined, and careful

conventional, down to earth, narrow
interests, and uncreative
disorganized, undependable, and
negligent

Neuroticism

nervous, high-strung, insecure, and
worrying

calm, relaxed, and secure

Extraversion

sociable, friendly, fun loving, and
talkative

introverted, reserved, inhibited, and
quiet

Table 2: Information Treatments
Treatment Information Description
A

Rank Order of Partner’s Agreeableness

B

Rank Order of Partner’s Openness to Experience

C

Rank Order of Partner’s Conscientiousness

D

Rank Order of Partner’s Neuroticism

E

Rank Order of Partner’s Extraversion

F

No Information

Note: In each session a subject will experience all of the treatments and all treatments are for the
duration of six rounds. The order of treatment is randomized across sessions. Subjects are note
provided with information on the number of rounds or number of treatments.
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Table 3: RE Tobit Regression: Continuous Measure of Personality Rankings

Partner’s rank
Personality distance
Round
Extraversion
Openness
Conscientiousness
Neuroticism
Agreeableness
Female
# of previous
experiments
Session FE
Log-Likelihood
Prob > chi squared
Observations

(1)
Agreeableness
-0.276***
(0.099)
0.217
-0.688***
0.401
-0.720
-2.870*
-0.998
3.821
1.605
-0.576

Dependent Variable: Contribution to the Public Good
(2)
(3)
(4)
Openness
Extraversion
Neuroticism
-0.190***
(0.074)
-0.045
(0.073)
0.086
(0.087)

(1.328)
(0.213)
(1.100)
(1.757)
(1.622)
(1.278)
(2.455)
(1.821)

0.797
-0.276*
0.029
-0.747
-2.411*
-0.544
3.385
2.247

(1.027)

-0.800

(0.818)
(0.168)
(0.974)
(1.555)
(1.442)
(1.122)
(2.119)
(1.619)

-0.886*
-0.441***
-0.214
-1.551
-3.194**
-2.216**
2.160
2.666*

(0.918)

0.407

(0.510)
(0.161)
(0.854)
(1.365)
(1.268)
(0.969)
(1.876)
(1.428)

-1.819***
-0.670***
0.0168
-1.302
-2.072
-2.232**
2.699
4.564***

(0.781)

-0.127

(5)
Conscientiousness
-0.060
(0.093)

(0.656)
(0.198)
(0.893)
(1.422)
(1.293)
(1.041)
(1.950)
(1.504)

-0.597
-0.079
0.039
0.785
-3.571**
-2.102*
1.162
4.916***

(0.813)

0.263

(0.857)
(0.201)
(1.027)
(1.641)
(1.515)
(1.171)
(2.230)
(1.772)
(0.944)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

-862.34
0.011
588

-899.76
0.154
588

-832.17
0.037
588

-834.57
0.000
588

-837.49
0.225
588

177

173

98

98

Uncensored
174
202
188
observations
Number of subjects
98
98
98
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 4: RE Tobit Regression: Non-continuous Personality Rankings
(1)
Agreeableness
Group 2
(Ranks: 6-9)
Group 3
(Ranks: 10-14)
Personality distance
Round
Extraversion
Openness
Conscientiousness
Neuroticism
Agreeableness
Female
# of previous
experiments
Session FE
Log-Likelihood
Prob > chi squared
Observations

Dependent Variable: Contribution to the Public Good
(2)
(3)
(4)
Openness
Extraversion
Neuroticism

(5)
Conscientiousness

-0.496

(0.974)

0.063

(0.767)

-1.299*

(0.749)

-0.055

(0.919)

0.039

(0.914)

-2.753***

(0.953)

-1.951***

(0.707)

-0.470

(0.680)

0.735

(0.821)

-0.540

(0.884)

0.515
-0.687***
0.442
-0.734
-2.773*
-0.962
3.828
1.564

(1.375)
(0.213)
(1.102)
(1.761)
(1.626)
(1.280)
(2.457)
(1.822)

1.167
-0.279*
0.035
-0.719
-2.375
-0.437
3.295
2.197

(0.846)
(0.167)
(0.980)
(1.564)
(1.452)
(1.131)
(2.134)
(1.629)

-1.100**
-0.434***
-0.212
-1.608
-3.209**
-2.156**
2.116
2.655*

(0.523)
(0.160)
(0.850)
(1.356)
(1.260)
(0.962)
(1.862)
(1.418)

-1.940***
-0.669***
0.034
-1.285
-2.091
-2.216**
2.693
4.498***

(0.696)
(0.198)
(0.894)
(1.422)
(1.293)
(1.041)
(1.952)
(1.506)

-0.523
-0.076
0.030
0.792
-3.554**
-2.087*
1.174
4.905***

(0.885)
(0.201)
(1.027)
(1.642)
(1.516)
(1.171)
(2.231)
(1.772)

-0.590

(1.030)

-0.782

(0.924)

0.415

(0.775)

-0.135

(0.813)

0.252

(0.945)

Y
-861.64
0.012
588

Y
-898.17
0.109
588

Y
-830.85
0.026
588

Uncensored
174
202
188
observations
Number of subjects
98
98
98
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% levels.
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Y
-834.52
0.000
588

Y
-837.45
0.275
588

177

173

98

98

Table 5: RE Tobit Regression: Predictors of Cooperative Behavior
Dependent Variable: Contribution to the Public Good
(1)
Personality Measures
Extraversion
Openness
Conscientiousness
Neuroticism
Agreeableness
Strategy
1 period lag (Public good)
2 period lag (Public good)

0.239
-1.203
-3.029**
-1.567
3.533*

-

(2)
(0.895)
(1.425)
(1.325)
(1.023)
(1.969)

(3)

0.407
-1.146
-3.171**
-1.527
3.440*

(0.861)
(1.371)
(1.285)
(0.983)
(1.901)

0.418
-1.001
-2.995**
-1.507*
3.249*

(0.795)
(1.266)
(1.185)
(0.908)
(1.755)

-

-0.168***
-

(0.035)
-

-0.152***
-0.215***

(0.035)
(0.035)

Expectations
Treatment A • partner’s rank
Treatment B • partner’s rank
Treatment C • partner’s rank
Treatment D • partner’s rank
Treatment E • partner’s rank

-0.217***
-0.244***
-0.011
0.109
-0.131

(0.085)
(0.082)
(0.085)
(0.086)
(0.086)

-0.203**
-0.232***
-0.009
0.130
-0.103

(0.087)
(0.083)
(0.086)
(0.088)
(0.087)

-0.215**
-0.225***
-0.031
0.097
-0.096

(0.087)
(0.083)
(0.086)
(0.088)
(0.087)

Personality Distance
Treatment A • personality distance
Treatment B • personality distance
Treatment C • personality distance
Treatment D • personality distance
Treatment E • personality distance

-0.026
0.922
-1.142**
-1.902***
0.208

(0.977)
(0.845)
(0.571)
(0.594)
(0.659)

-0.193
0.890
-0.920
-1.825***
0.132

(1.032)
(0.854)
(0.577)
(0.600)
(0.665)

0.085
0.742
-0.918
-1.646***
-0.168

(1.083)
(0.854)
(0.572)
(0.596)
(0.656)

Other Controls
Round
-0.432*** (0.088)
-0.429*** (0.092)
-0.441*** (0.093)
Female
3.691** (1.479)
3.865*** (1.430)
3.760*** (1.322)
# of previous experiments
-0.265 (0.827)
-0.268 (0.798)
-0.265 (0.737)
Treatment FE
Y
Y
Y
Ordering FE
Y
Y
Y
Session FE
Y
Y
Y
Log-Likelihood
-4,183
-4,013
-3,853
Prob > chi squared
0
0
0
Observations
2,940
2,856
2,772
Uncensored observations
914
878
852
Number of subjects
98
98
98
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels. Order fixed effects are used to control for the progression of treatments and are in
effect another type of duration control on subject’s experience. Personality traits of subjects are
measured on a Likert Scale between 0 and 5. The lag in play is defined as the level of public good
provided in the previous period. Treatment fixed effects interacted with partner’s rank control for
the expectations of cooperative behavior based on perceptions of personality
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix of Personality Traits
Agreeableness
Openness to Exp.
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Neuroticism

Agreeableness
1
0.1801
0.3508
-0.0403
-0.1940

Openness to Exp.
1
-0.0031
0.0743
0.0046

Table 7: Preferences for Information
Choosen Trait
Frequency
Agreeableness
100
Openness to Experience
39
Conscientiousness
50
Extraversion
27
Neuroticism
36
Total
252

Conscientiousness
1
0.1858
-0.3588

Percentage
40%
15%
20%
11%
14%
100%

Note: These frequencies are taken from the 3rd Stage of the experiment where
subjects chose which trait ranking to observe.
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Extraversion
1
-0.1563

Neuroticism
1

Appendix A: Instructions11
Welcome to an experiment about the economics of decision making!
Carefully read along with these instructions and feel free to ask the administrator
any questions you have. However, please do not communicate with the any other
participants at any time in the experiment.
In this experiment you will be paid $10 for your participation and
additional money based on your performance in the game. Any money earned
during the experiment will initially be recorded as experimental dollars. At the
end of this experiment, we will convert your experimental dollars into actual U.S.
dollars that will be given to you as you leave the lab. The more experimental
dollars you earn the more actual U.S. dollars you will receive at the end of the
experiment. At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be converted at a
rate of $1 US dollars for $20 experimental dollars. Throughout the game you will
be informed about how much money you have made so far. At the end of the
experiment, the total amount in this account will be added to the $10 participation
pay and you will be paid the total amount of money upon leaving.
Break:
First, you will complete a brief questionnaire. Your options are “strongly
disagree”, “disagree”, “neutral”, “agree”, and “strongly agree”. For instance, a
choice of “strongly disagree” means that you disagree a lot with the statement,
while a choice of “strongly agree” means that you agree a lot with the statement.
After they finish the Big Five Inventory:
You are about to engage in an economic decision making experiment. In each
round you will be paired with another, anonymous participant, which changes
randomly every round. How much money you earn depends on your own choice
and on the choice your partner.
You will participate in a number of rounds in this experiment. Each round is
independent, meaning that decisions during a round do not affect the future
rounds in any way. The only value that gets carried over across rounds is your
cumulative profit, which will be used to calculate your cash earnings at the end of
the experiment.
Break:
In this game you will have the option to remove money from a common fund and
place that money in an individual fund. The common fund starts out with 20 units
in it. You can take up to 10 units out of the common fund and into your individual
fund. The individual fund will return money to you at a rate of $0.75 for each unit
deposited into it. However, units left in the common fund by you and your partner
11

All text in bold and italics are for the reader to follow when the experiment moved forward to a
different screen or a handout was provided to subjects. The information that was handed out for
reference is indented.
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will return money to both you and your partner at $0.50 per unit in the common
fund.
Once you have made your decision, neither of you will ever be able to affect each
other's payouts in later parts of the experiment.
After each decision, you will be assigned a new partner and you will repeat the
decision with the new partner.
Once you have completed all of the rounds, you will be debriefed about the
experiment. As you leave the lab you will be paid based on the experimental
dollars you earned in the experiment.
On their own sheet:
We will now give you some examples of the game. If any of them are
confusing please raise your hand and ask for clarification.
Ex. 1. Say you remove 10 units from the common fund and your partner
removes 0 units from the common fund.
You would earn $7.50 in your individual fund and $5 from the common
fund, earning a total of $12.50. Your partner would earn $5 during this
round. In total $17.50 is earned by you and your partner
Ex. 2. If you removed 0 units from the common fund and your opponent
removed 0 units from the common fund you would both earn $10. In total
$20 is earned by you and your partner.
Ex. 3. If you both remove 10 units from the common fund then you would
both earn $7.50. In total $15 is earned by you and your partner.
Break:
Now you're going to play 4 practice rounds just to become familiar with the game.
Your results in these rounds will not affect how much money you receive at the
end of the experiment.
When they finish the practice rounds:
The practice rounds are now over. The decisions you make now WILL affect the
payout you receive at the end of the experiment.

Once they finish the practice rounds:
At the beginning of this experiment you took a questionnaire which rates your
responses based on personality traits. One of those traits was Agreeableness.
We ranked everyone in the experiment in terms of how they scored on
agreeableness and have provided the ranking of your partner(s) to you in the next
rounds. For example: if your partner has a rank of "1", they received the highest
score in terms of agreeableness out of everyone taking the experiment now.
These rankings are determined by the responses to the questionnaire and not your
decisions during this experiment.

33

To interpret the rankings of Agreeableness: 1 is the highest rank, 14 is the lowest
rank.
High ranking individuals tend to more be good natured, sympathetic, forgiving,
and courteous.
Low ranking individuals tend to more be critical, rude, harsh, and callous.

Screenshot of decision screen. This is an example- in the actual experiment
there were 14 subjects. The text reads: line 1: “Your partner’s openness rank
out of everyone in the experiment now:” line 2: “There are this many subjects
in the experiment right now:” line 3: “How much you can invest in you
individual fund:” line 4: “How much you will invest in your individual fund:”
Next treatment:
Extraversion Definition:
We also ranked everyone in the experiment in terms of how they scored on
extraversion and have provided the ranking of your partner(s) to you in the next
rounds. To interpret the rankings of Extraversion: 1 is the highest rank, 14 is the
lowest rank.
High ranking individuals tend to be more sociable, friendly, fun loving, and
talkative.
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Low ranking individuals tend to be more introverted, reserved, inhibited, and
quiet.
Next treatment:
Neuroticism Definition:
We ranked everyone in the experiment in terms of how they scored on
neuroticism and have provided the ranking of your partner(s) to you in the next
rounds.
To interpret the rankings of Neuroticism: 1 is the highest rank, 14 is the lowest
rank.
High ranking individuals tend to be more nervous, high-strung, insecure, and
worrying.
Low ranking individuals tend to be more calm, relaxed, secure, and hardy.
Next treatment:
Openness Definition:
We ranked everyone in the experiment in terms of how they scored on openness
and have provided the ranking of your partner(s) to you in the next rounds.
To interpret the rankings of Openness: 1 is the highest rank, 14 is the lowest rank.
High ranking individuals tend to be more original, creative, curious, and complex.
Low ranking individuals tend to be more conventional, down to earth, narrow
interests, and uncreative.
Next treatment:
Conscientiousness Definition:
We ranked everyone in the experiment in terms of how they scored on
conscientiousness and have provided the ranking of your partner(s) to you in the
next rounds.
To interpret the rankings of Conscientiousness: 1 is the highest rank, 14 is the
lowest rank.
High ranking individuals tend to be more reliable, well-organized, selfdisciplined, and careful.
Low ranking individuals tend to be more disorganized, undependable, and
negligent.
Stage 3:
In this part of the experiment you are going to have access to one of the five
indicators of your partner. You will get to choose which indicator you want to see
for each round. These indicators are:
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Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.

Screenshot of option to choose the personality trait ranking.
Here are the definitions of the indicators:12
Openness to Experience/Intellect-High ranking individuals tend to be
more original, creative, curious, and complex; Low ranking individuals
tend to be more conventional, down to earth, narrow interests, and
uncreative.
Conscientiousness- High ranking individuals tend to be more reliable,
well-organized, self-disciplined, and careful; Low ranking individuals tend
to be more disorganized, undependable, and negligent.
Extraversion-High ranking individuals tend to be more sociable, friendly,
fun loving, and talkative; Low ranking individuals tend to be more
introverted, reserved, inhibited, and quiet.
Agreeableness-High ranking individuals tend to be more good natured,
sympathetic, forgiving, and courteous; Low ranking individuals tend to be
more critical, rude, harsh, and callous.
Neuroticism-High ranking individuals tend to be more nervous, highstrung, insecure, and worrying; Low ranking individuals tend to be more
calm, relaxed, and secure
12

A handout was also provided with these definitions for reference.
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